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A RATIONAL APPROACH TO 
RESPONSIBILITYt 
Christopher Slobogin * 
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP. By 
Michael S. Moore. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1984. 
Pp. xiv, 527. Cloth, $59.50; paper, $18.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
"Determinism" - the idea that human behavior is caused by fac-
tors beyond the individual's control - has always been a troublesome 
subject for lawyers. The basis for the determinist position varies: be-
haviorism views human action as a mechanistic response to external 
stimuli; 1 the psychoanalytic contention is that all or most behavior is 
the product of unconscious drives and conflicts shaped by childhood 
experiences;2 those with physiological perspectives theorize that be-
havior is ruled by chemical reactions in the body.3 But regardless of 
etioJogy, determinism erodes the basis for attributing personal respon-
sibility. If an individual's behavior is caused by factors outside his 
control, how can we hold him morally and legally responsible for it? 
Legal scholars usually have either chosen to ignore this question4 
or, in what amounts to the same thing, have posited "free will" for 
legal purposes. Representative of the latter approach is the following 
statement from Herbert Packer: 
Very simply, the law treats man's conduct as autonomous and willed, 
not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if it were. It is 
desirable because the capacity of the individual human being to live his 
life in reasonable freedom from socially imposed external constraints 
(the only kind with which the law is concerned) would be fatally im-
paired unless the law provides a locus poenitentiae, a point of no return 
t The author would like to thank Professor Richard Bonnie of the University of Virginia 
Law School and Professors Stanley Ingber and Toni Massaro of the University of Florida Law 
School for their comments on earlier versions of this review. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, Gainesville. A.B. 1973, Princeton Uni-
versity; J.D. 1977, LL.M. 1979, University of Virginia. - Ed. 
1. See generally B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1972); K SPENCE, BEHAV-
IOR THEORY AND CoNDmONING (1956). 
2. See generally Freud, A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, in 54 GREAT BOOKS OP 
THE WESTERN WORLD 449 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952). 
3. See generally N. CHOMSKY, RULES AND REPRESENTATIONS 217-54 (1980); Rapaport, On 
the Psychoanalytic Theory of Motivation, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 173, 183-
212 (M. Jones ed. 1960). 
4. See, e.g., W. JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE 147-48 (1897). 
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beyond which external constraints may be imposed but before which the 
individual is free-not free of whatever compulsions determinists tell us 
he labors under but free of the very specific social compulsions of the 
law.5 
One way of reconciling the apparent tension between the scientific 
and the legal view of persons is to jettison the notion of retributive 
justice. If the idea of personal blameworthiness is meaningless, pun-
ishment could instead be premised on the need to prevent future crime 
by the individual in question. 6 
A less jarring resolution of the supposed conflict is to show that it 
does not exist. In one of the more important recent works on the issue 
of human responsibility, Professor Michael Moore of the University of 
Southern California School of Law attempts to do just that. In Law 
and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, Moore concedes at the 
outset that behavior can be caused by what he calls "mechanistic" 
forces - physiology, the environment, and unconscious mental states. 
But, arguing from a linguistic philosophical perspective, he concludes 
that merely because a person's behavior is caused by such factors does 
not mean that the person lacks responsibility for it. Rather, persons 
are "caused causers" and therefore responsible, generally, whenever 
their "actions" are the result of "practical reasoning" (terms to be de-
fined later in this review). According to Moore, only when an actor's 
ability to reason practically is impaired may he be excused for his acts. 
Moore in essence is reasserting a traditional concept of personhood 
that has undergone severe strain since Freud, Skinner and others have 
attempted to identify the factors that predict human behavior. 
In addition to this substantive thesis, Moore has a less controver-
sial "methodological" thesis. Lawyers and psychiatrists, he argues, 
both need to pay more attention to the philosophical underpinnings of 
their respective professions. To the extent they lose sight of these fun-
damental tenets (and Moore implies that they have), interaction be-
tween the two disciplines is likely to be misfocused and the substantial 
common ground between them obscured. 
Critiquing Moore's substantive thesis is a gargantuan task, because 
Moore himself attempts to do so much - in effect, he examines and 
then recasts the principal assumptions of both the law and the behav-
ioral sciences. Because it is the primary thrust of the book, Moore's 
approach to the nature of human responsibility will be the focus of this 
review. The first portion of the review will outline the philosophical 
foundation for these arguments. The remainder of the review, in im-
plicit recognition of Moore's methodological thesis, will explore the 
5. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968). 
6. See generally K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968); B. WOOTTON, 
CRIME AND PENAL POLICY 220-39 (1978). A significant practical problem associated with this 
approach is the difficulty in predicting dangerousness. See generally J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING 
VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN AssESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 21-67 (1981). 
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practical implications of his ideas for criminal "mental health" law, a 
rubric meant to include the insanity defense, subjective mens rea re-
quirements, and the diminished responsibility doctrine, as well as the 
admissibility of expert testimony on these issues. For the most part, 
this exploration will take the form of assessing the worth of Moore's 
own thoughts about the ramifications of his work. Occasionally, how-
ever, it will entail application of his substantive thesis to issues which 
Law and Psychiatry considers only tangentially. 
I. PRACTICAL REASON AND HUMAN ACTION 
Law and Psychiatry is a difficult book. To grasp its contents fully 
will probably take more than one reading even for those with some 
sophistication in the area. But the book's major tenets can be summa-
rized briefly. 
The concept which is central to Moore's thesis is that of practical 
reasoning, reasoning which tells us what to do (as opposed to what to 
believe). The pattern of practical reasoning can be expressed as 
follows: 
1. X desires q (e.g., Let it be the case that the wine be chilled). 
2. X believes that doing p will produce q (e.g., If I open the window, 
then the wine will be chilled). 
3. X does p (e.g., I open the window). 
If in fact X does p because of a desire for q and in the belief that doing 
p will produce q, then, asserts Moore, we can say that p was an inten-
tional action explained by X's belief/desire set (pp. 13-14). When a 
person acts according to this type of practical syllogism, he causes an 
action which is rationalized by his desires and beliefs. 
Moore contends that this type of reason-giving process provides a 
valid explanation of behavior, regardless of what other factors may 
have contributed to the conduct. 7 He defends this contention against 
several possible attacks, all of which should be examined here because 
Moore's responses help one comprehend his later analysis of legal and 
moral responsibility. 
First, Moore must deal with the philosophical argument that rea-
sons cannot be causes because reasons serve exclusively a rationalizing 
function. Under this view, reasons are merely justifications for ac-
tions; because we prefer a rational account of human activity, each 
person views his behavior as done for reasons, when in fact the reasons 
are irrelevant to the causal chain. 8 
To this objection, Moore makes two responses. First, for any given 
action, there will presumably always be more than one belief/desire set 
7. Moore himself states: "My own determinist and mechanist assumptions are that human 
behavior is fully determined by mechanistic kinds of happenings in the human body," P. 33. 
8. See, e.g., P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSO-
PHY 45-51 (1958). 
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that can rationalize it. How are we to choose one set over another 
unless through an analysis of which set we think caused the action 
done (p. 23)? Second, our way of becoming aware of our reasons sug-
gests that belief/desire sets are not mere interpretations for the sake of 
convincing ourselves we are rational. Persons can know the objects of 
their desires and beliefs in a "nonobservational" way; that is, they be-
come aware of these desires and beliefs in a way an observer seeking to 
justify the person's actions cannot. For instance, one can know one 
wants wine to be chilled without even a silent soliloquy about that 
desire. From this fact (and an assumption that physiological events 
cause such nonobservational knowledge), Moore deduces that desires 
and beliefs exist independently of any attempt to provide meaning to 
behavior (pp. 24-25). 
In my view, neither of these arguments proves that reasons cause 
behavior. But taken together, they considerably weaken the interpre-
tivist stance that reasons are mere rationalizations. More problematic 
is Moore's insinuation that, assuming reasons do cause behavior, we 
can conclusively ascertain those reasons. He asserts that we can dis-
cover causal desires and beliefs through the person's avowals (p. 25). 
Yet he also admits, as I shall discuss in greater detail later, that a 
person may act for reasons unknown to him. Moreover, in the practi-
cal context addressed in this article - the mental state of individuals 
charged with crime - it is quite likely that a person's stated reasons 
for acting will be suspect on other grounds. The point is not that the 
interpretivist position is correct philosophically, but that when we try 
to reach conclusions about the true reasons for behavior we often rely, 
for lack of anything better to go on, upon observer attributions. And 
when we rely upon such "observational" knowledge, we in effect be-
come interpretivists, whether or not we think reasons cause behavior 
in the abstract. Moore never confronts this dilemma squarely, but 
then it is outside the scope of his book. 
A quite different attack against reason-giving explanations assumes 
that desires and beliefs in fact do cause behavior, but suggests that 
they do not always "rationalize" it.9 For instance, to use Moore's ex-
ample, one's belief that a murderer is prowling in the hall could cause 
one's heart to palpitate. The threat that this type of event poses to the 
concept of practical reasoning is that, while it is caused by a belief, it 
does not involve an agent pursuing intelligible ends; the end result (the 
palpitation) happens irrespective of any rationalization process. 
Moore admits that this type of bodily movement is not performed 
for reasons, despite its being caused by a belief. But he also points out 
that reason-giving explanations are only meant to explain human ac-
tions. Here, he argues, no such "action" is involved because there is 
9. See, e.g., Fay, Practical .. ~easoning, Rationality and the Explanation of Intentional Action. 
8 J. THEORY Soc. BEHAVIOUR 77 (1978). 
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not the requisite connection between the bodily movement and the ac-
tor's knowledge. Unless the actor knows he can do a particular move-
ment and knows when he is exercising that power, the movement 
cannot be called an action by the actor. Moore quotes Wittgenstein's 
pithy statement to the same effect: "Human actions are marked by the 
absence of surprise."10 Given this definition, the heart palpitation in 
the above example is not a human action but rather what Moore calls 
a "nonaction event," just as is a reflex or an arm movement during 
sleep. Nonaction events do not require rationalizations and thus do 
not threaten the concept of practical reasoning (pp. 15-19).11 
One final objection to the concept of practical reasoning is the re-
ductionist argument that reasons cannot be separated from other 
causes and thus do not, by themselves, either cause or rationalize be-
havior. The reductionist claim comes in two forms. The behaviorist 
argument is that reasons are mere constructs; they have no existence 
independent of behavioral criteria because the only way to verify such 
mental states is through observation of behavior.12 The physiological 
reductionist, on the other hand, argues that reasons are identical to 
certain kinds of brain states.13 If either of these contentions is correct, 
then reason-giving explanations cannot be seen as causal factors sepa-
rate from other factors (i.e., behavior or neuron firings), and actions, 
despite the above definition, would be nothing more than bodily 
movements. 
With respect to the behaviorist reductionist claim, Moore's princi-
pal response is the observation that mental words such as "desire" and 
"belief' are individuated by the objects they take. One does not desire 
or believe in the abstract; one desires that q will occur and one believes 
that doing p will cause q to occur. To speak of desires and beliefs in 
any other way makes no sense (p. 38). But the behaviorist approach 
cannot account for this individuation. As Moore states in one of his 
other works: 
One could not, for example, distinguish a desire to stand on Cicero's 
grave from a desire to stand on Tully's grave on the basis of behavior of 
someone tending to place himself on that grave, for Cicero and Tully 
10. P. 74 (citing L. WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 162 (2d ed. 1958)). 
For a more detailed discussion of Moore's treatment of actions, see text at notes 32-36 infra. 
11. It is also possible for desires and beliefs to cause actions without rationalizing them. 
Moore imagines a prisoner who rattles the bars of his cell "because he wants out." P. 16. The 
bar-rattling is an action because the prisoner knows he is doing it, and the action is admittedly 
"caused" by the desire to escape. Is the prisoner therefore acting for reasons? Moore would say 
no, because, unlike the person who opens the window in order to chill the wine, the prisoner is 
not motivated to perform his action by a desire; rather his bar-rattling merely expresses the desire 
to escape. Only if the prisoner actually believed that this action would lead to escape could it be 
said he acted for "reasons." 
12. See, e.g., G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 83-115 (1950); Carnap, Psychology in Physi-
cal Language, in LoGICAL PosmvISM 165 (A. Ayer ed. 1959). 
13. See e.g., A. GARFINKEL, FORMS OF EXPLANATION: RETHINKING THE QUESTIONS IN 
SOCIAL THEORY 49 (1981); Rapaport, supra note 3, at 187-89. 
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were one and the same person, and thus, there is only one grave. 
An actor may desire to stand on Cicero's grave, but ignorant of the fact 
that Cicero was Tully, not want to stand on Tully's grave. . .. Thus, no 
equivalence may be asserted between behavioral criteria and a mental 
word such as "desire."14 
Even assuming this problem can be overcome, Moore points out that 
behaviorists are merely stipulating, rather than proving, that behavior 
is the only criterion for mental states. In fa~t, desires and beliefs may 
be physiologically rooted (p. 38). Until this latter hypothesis is dis-
proved, the behaviorist equation of mental states with behavior is 
specious. 
Precisely because we do not have sufficient scientific information 
about the physiology of mental states, Moore has more trouble dealing 
with the second reductionist argument. He admits that desires and 
beliefs may in fact be identical to brain states. But he ultimately 
adopts what he calls a "functionalist" perspective on mental states: 
because we do not yet know whether the identity thesis is true, we can 
view desires and beliefs as provisionally independent of brain states, 
and thereby focus on "the role such states play in [the] person's intelli-
gent functioning" (p. 35), rather than on how they are physically real-
ized in that person. This assumption is crucial to Moore's approach to 
responsibility, detailed in Part II of this review. It allows one to be-
lieve (as does Moore) that "mechanistic kinds of happenings in the 
human body" cause human behavior (p. 33), while at the same time 
permitting one to attribute causal power to belief/desire sets. More-
over, "it makes intelligible how belief/ desire states could cause behav-
ior even if such states do not turn out to be physical states of the 
brain" (p. 35). 
This brief recounting of Moore's arguments for viewing reason-
giving explanations as legitimate explanations of human behavior does 
not reveal the elaborate nature of his reasoning. But it does expose his 
central premises: (1) that whether a bodily movement is an action 
depends on what a person knows he can do and on what he knows 
himself to be doing; and (2) that reasons (belief/desire sets) can both 
cause and rationalize behavior independently of other factors. The 
question now becomes what importance these conclusions have for the 
moral issues faced by the criminal law. 
II. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF MOORE'S THESIS FOR THE 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
In Moore's view, the concept of practical reasoning makes it possi-
ble for a retributive system of justice and a scientifically based deter-
minism to co-exist. Moore's central moral assertion is that one is 
14. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151, 212 (1981) (footnote 
omitted). 
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responsible for one's actions, however they are caused, so long as they 
are not the result of "disturbed"15 practical reasoning. When a person 
acts for reasons, he, as a person, is the "proximate" cause of his ac-
tions. He should thus generally be held responsible for them. 
Moore calls this position "soft determinism" or "compatibilism" 
(p. 361). To understand the concept fully, it should be distinguished 
from "hard determinism," which adopts the view that persons are 
compelled to act in certain ways because of internal or external fac-
tors.16 Moore argues that compulsion and causation are two separate 
concepts. Put simply, a causal factor is not a compulsion unless it 
interferes with one's practical reasoning process. 
Moore fleshes out this point with several examples: 
That I am caused to go downtown by my desire to get a haircut is hardly 
a case of compulsion. This is my uncompelled act, the product of my 
undisturbed practical reasoning. 
Similarly, if I am caused to engage in sharp practices by my greedy 
character, this is not to say I am compelled. My greed is my characteris-
tic way of unconstrained dealing with others in financial matters. It does 
not constrain my powers of practical reasoning so much as describe how 
I decide when I am unconstrained. 
Similarly, there are doubtlessly large numbers of physiological states 
and events necessary for each of us to engage in various kinds of basic 
acts. . . . Such causes hardly disturb our practical reasonings; rather, 
they are the conditions that make possible the execution of our desires in 
action. 17 
Finally, Moore states, "[s]imply because what a person desires or be-
lieves is caused by his environment in no way makes the exercise of 
[the capacity to reason practically] difficult" (p. 364). A poverty-
stricken childhood may lead one to believe that crime is the best way 
to earn a living, which belief may in tum cause crime, but to the extent 
the person with such a history retains the ability to formulate desires 
and beliefs in an undisturbed fashion he cannot be said to be com-
pelled to commit crime. 
Has Moore proffered any new theoretical insight here? Or has he 
merely gerrymandered the concepts of causation and compulsion? In 
one sense, he, like Packer, is simply "positing" personal agency. He 
admits that a soft determinist must "show that determinism is compat-
ible with the principle that punishment is unjust unless the actor 
'could have done other than he did' " (p. 488 n. 34), yet he makes no 
15. Moore's conception of disturbed or invalid practical reasoning is described in this re· 
view's sections on the insanity defense and the diminished responsibility notion. See Parts II.A. 
& 11.D. infra. 
16. For examples of this point of view, see Hospers, Free Will and Psychoanalysis, in FREE· 
DOM AND RE.sPONSIBILITY: READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 463 (H. Morris ed. 1961); 
Rapaport, supra note 3, at 187. 
17. P. 363 (footnote omitted). 
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attempt to do so himself. 18 All that his formulation of compulsion sug-
gests is that only a few causal factors actually disturb practical reason-
ing; it does not show that in any given case a person, with or without 
the capacity to reason practically, could have acted differently. 
What Moore does claim to have established, as he says elsewhere in 
the book, is the "possibility of there being differing sets of equally suffi-
cient conditions existing to cause the same event" (p. 226): 
To say that a bodily movement is the product of an abnormal condition 
of the brain does not preclude one from describing that movement as an 
action performed by an agent for reasons. We have two vocabularies: 
that of movement and mechanical causation, and that of actions and 
reasons. Merely because scientists may discover lesions in the brain is 
not to preclude the application of the language of action and reasons. 
When there are mechanically caused movements there may nonetheless 
be intelligent actions. 19 
Assuming (as discussed earlier) the provisional independence of 
reason-giving language from the language of natural science, the next 
step for Moore is an admittedly semantic one. The set of causal condi-
tions (and vocabulary terms) which should be used to explain a bodily 
movement depends quite literally on what one is talking about. If, as 
is true in the law and in everyday existence, we are seeking to explain 
behavior in terms of moral accountability, the language of actions and 
reasons is both necessary and sufficient. The language of mechanical 
causation, while it may explain behavior scientifically, is not germane 
to our understanding behavior in the moral sense (p. 226). Thus, 
whatever causes might be considered "compelling" in the scientific 
context, in the moral context they consist only of those causes (such as 
a gun to the head or addiction) which dominate one's reasons for 
acting. 
The linguistic approach to such issues can be attacked, of course.20 
But if we can accept the closely related propositions that reason-giving 
explanations are the linchpin of responsibility analysis and that causa-
tion does not mean compulsion, then we have a powerful conceptual 
tool at our disposal. It is the burden of the remainder of this review to 
demonstrate this point. 
A. Recasting the Insanity Defense 
The area most dramatically affected by the concept of practical 
reason is the insanity defense, to which Moore devotes an entire chap-
ter. Before discussing his conclusions about the scope of the defense, it 
18. However, Moore does address this issue in his most recent work, Moore, Determinism 
and the Excuses, 13 CALIF. L. REv. (forthcoming 1985). 
19. P. 226 (footnote omitted). 
20. See generally A. LoUCH, EXPLANATION AND HUMAN ACTION (1966); THE LINGUISTIC 
TURN: RECENT EssAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (R. Rorty ed. 1967). 
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is worth noting - if only because of recent antipathy toward exculpa-
tory doctrines based on mental illness - that his thesis strongly af-
firms the role of the insanity defense as a necessary and integral aspect 
of criminal justice. If responsibility and the ability to form practical 
syllogisms are so closely connected, then one whose ability to reason 
practically is significantly impaired cannot justly be held responsible. 
Yet without the insanity defense, such an individual would be held 
responsible for his actions. The defense is therefore central to our 
view that moral agents are beings who have some capacity to act for 
reasons.21 
The methodological question here, of course, is when a person's 
practical reasoning ability is so impaired that responsibility cannot be 
ascribed to him. One could say that the bare capacity to think in the 
form of practical syllogisms is sufficient for this purpose. Thus, to 
paraphrase one of the classical illustrations of insanity, if a person 
desires lemon juice and believes that squeezing his wife's neck will pro-
duce the juice (because he thinks she has juice in her veins), then he 
would be responsible for strangling his wife, if he in fact did so as a 
result of this belief/ desire set. 
Moore would agree with virtually everyone else that this person is 
"insane," despite the fact that his reasons caused and rationalized his 
action. Where he differs from the current approach to insanity is in 
his explanation of why this person should not be held morally respon-
sible. Most states rely either on the M'Naghten test (excusing a per-
son who because of mental disease or defect did not know the nature 
and quality of his act or that the act was wrong), M'Naghten and the 
so-called "irresistible impulse test," or the American Law Institute 
test (excusing a person who, because of mental disease or defect, lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or 
to conform his conduct at the time of the offense to the requirements 
of the law).22 Moore argues that these tests do not capture the core 
notion of why mental·disability excuses behavior. As he puts it, "there 
is something about mental illness itself that precludes responsibility, 
irrespective of there being any ignorance about the nature of the par-
21. The view that responsibility and the ability to reason practically are intimately associated 
also rebuts the argument that the insanity doctrine must take into account environmental factors 
such as poverty. Judge Bazelon has straightforwardly argued for such an expansion of the de-
fense on the ground that no valid distinction can be made between actions caused by mental 
illness and those caused by external factors. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 385, 396 (1976). Professor Morris, also seeing no such distinction, contends con-
versely that the defense should be abolished, since to allow it its logical scope would swallow the 
criminal law. N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 61-63 (1982). Moore shows that 
when the issue is personal responsibility rather than mere causation, external factors are irrele-
vant unless, as discussed above, they interfere with practical reasoning. 
22. For a complete list of state and federal rules of insanity as of 1981, see Favole, Mental 
Disability in the American Criminal Process: A Four Issue Survey, in MENTALLY DISORDERED 
OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 247, 257-69 (J. Monahan & H. 
Steadman eds. 1983). 
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ticular crime or its prohibited nature, and irrespective of there being 
any excuse of compulsion" (p. 230). For Moore, the distinguishing 
characteristic of the mentally ill is their "irrationality": 
One is a moral agent only if one is a rational agent. Only if we can see 
another being as one who acts to achieve some rational end in light of 
some rational beliefs will we understand him in the same fundamental 
way that we understand ourselves and our fellow persons in everyday 
life. We regard as moral agents only those beings we can understand in 
this way. [Pp. 244-45.] 
From this assertion, Moore concludes that the appropriate test for in-
sanity is whether the accused is "so irrational as to be nonresponsible" 
(p. 245). 
One first notices that Moore's test lacks the "mental illness" predi-
cate found in virtually all other insanity formulations. I think this 
omission is a sensible one. The expanded definition that psychiatry 
has given the term is, as he asserts, a type of "conceptual imperialism" 
which results more from an effort to define the types of conditions 
psychiatrists might "treat" than from a disciplined effort to grapple 
with the problem of what constitutes an improperly functioning mind 
(pp. 198-210).23 In light of the psychiatric baggage that now comes 
with the idea of mental illness, Moore is right to eschew its use in his 
definition of insanity, and to focus instead on the legally relevant 
debilitating aspects of mental dysfunction. 
I also believe that Moore is correct in his conclusion that "irration-
ality" is the aspect of mental dysfunction which excuses behavior (if 
that term is appropriately defined, a problem which will be deferred 
for the moment). As I shall discuss in this review's section on dimin-
ished responsibility, Moore concedes that ignorance and compulsion 
due to mental abnormality - the traditional prongs of the insanity 
defense - are at least partial excuses in their own right. Presumably 
each might also easily lead to irrationality. But Moore argues, I think 
convincingly, that it is the latter attribute which most directly under-
girds our traditional notion of "mental illness," and thus our tradi-
tional notion of "insanity" (pp. 195-98). Typically, when we say a 
person is mentally ill or "crazy" or "mad," we are not referring to his 
knowledge of right from wrong or his ability to control his behavior, 
but to the fact that his actions do not make sense in a fundamental 
way. These labels apply when a person's reasons for acting are wildly 
irrational - when they are difficult, if not impossible, to empathize 
with. As Moore points out, the ancients' synonym for mental illness 
was "loss of reason" (p. 196). 
23. At times Moore seems even to suggest that the modern psychiatric definition of mental 
illness should be coextensive with the law's definition of insanity. Compare pp. 207-10 with pp. 
243-45. If so, he may be conflating normative and descriptive concerns. In any event, the proper 
clinical parameters of mental illness is a topic far beyond the scope of this discussion of criminal 
mental health law. 
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Of course, there is considerable overlap between current tests of 
insanity and an irrationality test. Conceptually at least, the latter test 
and the cognitive formulas (M'Naghten and the first half of the ALI 
rule) would seem to be almost congruent. There is a direct relation-
ship between the rationality of one's reasons and the ability to perceive 
and understand the nature or wrongfulness of what one is actually 
doing. Without the latter capacities, desires and beliefs are bound to 
be irrational. Moore recognizes this point when he says, "the mental 
abilities of perception, memory, imagination, and particularly reason-
ing are necessary in the acquisition of rational beliefs and in maintain-
ing consistency between belief sets and desire sets" (p. 197). 
The same relationship does not exist, however, between an irra-
tionality test and the volitional or control components of traditional 
insanity rules (e.g., the second half of the ALI test and the so-called 
"irresistible impulse" rule). While a person whose acts are "com-
pelled" or "irresistible" is, by Moore's definition, one whose practical 
reasoning is disturbed by external or internal factors, that reasoning 
may still be rational. The "compelled" individual, according to 
Moore, is merely one who finds it particularly difficult to avoid choos-
ing a particular action, not one who necessarily acts for grossly irra-
tional reasons. 
If this latter point is correct, it provides theoretical support for the 
current movement toward elimination of volitional impairment as an 
independent component of the insanity test,24 a movement which to 
date has been bottomed more on practical concerns relating to the dif-
ficulty of proving such impairment than on solid conceptual 
grounds.25 More generally, the observations made above suggest that 
an irrationality test for insanity is the most forthright manner of ad-
dressing the moral concerns which originally gave rise to the insanity 
defense. 
Moore's insanity formulation is thus a step forward. It suffers sig-
nificantly, however, from a failure to provide an adequate definition of 
rationality. Like mental illness, the term is subject to multiple inter-
pretations, and jurors, as reliable as their intuitions may usually be, are 
unlikely to reach consistent results on the issue with no guidance from 
the law. 
Elsewhere in the book, Moore himself implicitly recognizes this 
point when he constructs a multi-level definition of rationality using 
practical reasoning terminology (pp. 100-08). The least demanding 
definition of a rational being is one who has "intelligible" desires and 
24. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 1, 1982, ch. 143, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws; CRIMINAL JUS'l'ICB 
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.1 & commentary on ~(a) (First Tentative Draft 1983); 
STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 10-12 (American Psychiatric Assn. 1982); see also note 
52 infra. 
25. It can still be argued, of course, that compulsion by reason of mental illness should be an 
independent ground of excuse. But see note 55 infra and accompanying text. 
February 1985] Approach to Responsibility 831 
beliefs, meaning one whose desires and beliefs are not wildly "inconsis-
ten[t] or incoheren[t] with popularly held [desires or] beliefs of a soci-
ety" (p. 105). A second, more rigorous definition of rationality 
requires not only that the person's desires and beliefs be intelligible but 
that they be consistent with one another, at least such that the person 
can identify and act upon what he most wants when faced with con-
flicting desires or upon what he most strongly believes when faced 
with conflicting beliefs. An even more constraining requirement is 
that of "transitivity," meaning that one's desires and beliefs are intelli-
gible and free from direct contradiction and, additionally, that they 
logically cohere with and are implied by one another. Finally, the 
strongest sense of rationality includes the first three requirements and 
adds the idea that the desires and beliefs be "correct" or "true." 
Moore's dissection of the rationality concept is a decided advance 
over previous efforts.26 But his application of this framework to the 
insanity inquiry is questionable. He appears to take the position that 
to be sane a person must be judged rational in the first three senses, 
but not in the fourth.27 That is, if a person's desires and beliefs are 
relatively intelligible, consistent with one another, and coherent, then 
he is sane for legal and moral purposes; to require further that his 
desires be "correct" and his beliefs "true" is not morally necessary or 
appropriate. On this latter point, I agree. Otherwise, very few individ-
uals charged with crime would be responsible; most criminal acts 
spring from an obviously incorrect desire or from an untrue belief. 
And where the "correctness" of the person's reasons is not obvious, it 
would often be impossible to determine fairly. 
On the other hand, Moore's apparent stance that to be insane a 
person's reasons for acting must not only be unintelligible, but incon-
sistent and incoherent as well, denies clinical reality. Many psychotic 
individuals, including conceivably the lemon-squeezer, have hallucina-
tory belief systems which are internally coherent. 28 Yet we would still 
find these individuals insane. 
For me, unintelligibility of reasons alone is a sufficient basis for 
insanity. This concept must itself be defined, however, so as to encom-
pass only those desires and beliefs which are inconsistent with those 
held by others in the individual's societal group. Otherwise a "ra-
tional" individual from an alien or isolated subculture might be ex-
cused on insanity grounds merely for engaging in his normal, if 
26. See, e.g., H. FINGARETIE & A. HAssE, MENTAL DISABILmES AND CRIMINAL RESPON-
SIBILITY 218-39 (1979). 
27. See p. 207. 
28. This is particularly true of those psychotic individuals with paranoid disorders. See 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 197 (3d ed. 1980) (defining the essential feature of paranoia as "a permanent and 
unshakable delusional system accompanied by preservation of clear and orderly thinking"); see 
also descriptions of Shared Paranoid Disorder and Acute Paranoid Disorder. Id. at 197. 
832 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:820 
sociologically rare, behavior, because of its unintelligibility to the 
majority.29 
If what has been outlined above is the morally appropriate stan-
dard for the insanity defense, and I think it is, then irrationality should 
be defined accordingly, rather than left open to other interpretations. 
So modified the test might be: 
An insane person is one who is so irrational at the time of the offense 
that he is not responsible for it. Irrationality is measured by the extent 
to which the desires or beliefs which motivated the offense are unintel-
ligible in light of what the person's society commonly desires and 
believes. 
This test captures the essence of rationality as it should be defined 
for insanity purposes and thus provides better guidance for the 
factfinder than does Moore's vague formulation. It should inhibit any 
tendency on the part of the factfinder to find "irrational," and thus 
probative of insanity, incorrect but intelligible desires (such as a jeal-
ousy-inspired urge to kill one's spouse) or beliefs (such as a belief that 
stealing is justified when you are poor). It also properly ties intelligi-
bility to the person's cultural background, thus avoiding insanity ac-
quittals in those infrequent cases involving desires and beliefs foreign 
to the factfinder but intelligible to the defendant's subgroup. At the 
same time, the test makes clear that the data relevant to the insanity 
inquiry are the individual's mental states - his actual desires and be-
liefs - and not what one might infer from looking solely at his behav-
ior. A poor person who robs a store may appear rational, but 
determining whether he is in fact so requires an investigation of his 
practical reasoning capacity. 
The final difference between Moore's test and the one proposed 
above may be the most important. Unlike the proposal, Moore's for-
mulation makes no effort to tie the finding of irrationality to the of-
fense which triggers the individual's involvement in the legal system. 
It is probable that this was not an oversight on Moore's part. He criti-
cizes current insanity tests because "[t]hey assume that legal insanity 
is an excuse for the particular acts done, not a general status attached 
to a class of human beings who are not accountable agents."30 I agree 
that an insane person should be excused because of the type of being 
he is (a bad practical reasoner). Yet surely such a person can murder 
for irrational reasons one day and rob for rational reasons the next. 
Under such circumstances, the robbery should not be excused. Con-
versely, while there may be no such thing as truly temporary insanity, 
there are "normal" people whose ability to reason practically is seri-
29. Cf. Rex v. Esop, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1836) (defendant, a native of Bagh· 
dad, convicted for committing an "unnatural offence" despite argument his act was no crime in 
his native land). It is conceivable that the acts of some terrorist groups would appear "unintel· 
ligible" to juries in this country, yet considered in the terrorist milieu they "make sense." 
30. P. 222 (emphasis in original). 
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ously deficient for a short period of time;31 if they happen to commit a 
criminal act during this period, they should be excused. To the extent 
that Moore's emphasis on insanity as a status leads him to ignore these 
possibilities, he is inappropriately restructuring the relevant moral 
inquiry. 
B. The Misnamed Voluntary Act Doctrine 
Law and Psychiatry takes on many legal issues other than the in-
sanity defense. An important issue both for its own sake and because 
it sets the stage for Moore's discussion of intentionality is the scope of 
the actus reus requirement. In describing this requirement, some com-
mentators speak of the need to show the accused's act was "volun-
tary. "32 Use of this word can cause confusion: is someone who steals 
with a gun to his head, while experiencing a strong craving for drugs 
or in a last-ditch attempt to feed a starving child acting voluntarily? Is 
the person who discovers his wife being beaten by a stranger acting 
voluntarily when he kills the assailant in a sudden fit of rage? Tradi-
tionally, of course, none of these individuals could claim an "involun-
tary act" defense. Given the emphasis on practical reasoning up to 
this point, a tempting rationale for this result might be to say that the 
actus reus requirement is met if one moves for reasons; in fact that is 
the stance many legal scholars take. 33 Yet while the thieves described 
above would probably be said to be acting for reasons, the "involun-
tary" act claim of the impulsive killer - the person who acts "without 
thinking" - is not so easily dismissed. 
Moore's definition of action34 better explains why the impulsive 
killer would have no actus reus claim. To Moore, the determination of 
whether one is responsible for a bodily movement is primarily con-
cerned with knowledge, and with whether an "act" can be said to have 
occurred at all. Practical reasoning and the related idea of "voluntary 
action" are only tangential to the inquiry. 
Moore makes a standard philosophical distinction between basic 
acts and complex actions. The former are those acts which do not 
31. See, e.g .• the case of Joy Baker, described in P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMI-
NAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 660-69 (1982). The American Psychiatric Association's Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual recognizes two relatively brief types of psychosis, reactive 
schizophrenia (of rapid onset and brief duration with the affected individual appearing well both 
before and after the schizophrenic episode), and schizophreniform disorder (clinical features 
same as schizophrenia but duration ofless than six months). See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC As-
SOCIATION, supra note 28, at 199-202; see also description of Atypical Psychosis. Id. at 202-03. 
32. See, e.g .• J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 427, 1095 (4th ed. 1873); G. 
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW§ 6.4 (1978); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54 
(1881); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 25 (1972). But see H. 
HART, Acts of Will and Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 90 (1968). 
33. See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, supra note 32, at 426-27; Mackie, The Grounds of Responsibility, in 
LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 175-88 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977). 
34. Discussed briefiy in text at notes 9-11 supra. 
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require any antecedent action (such as raising one's arm) (p. 68); the 
latter require a basic act or acts and some type of practical reasoning 
aimed at achieving some goal (such as opening the window, driving a 
car, or robbing a bank) (pp. 75-76). The so-called voluntary act doc-
trine is not concerned with complex actions,35 but rather with whether 
basic movements, such as raising one's arm, can morally be called the 
actor's. Moore asserts that when a person's arm is blown upward by 
the wind, rises because of a reflex action to some stimulus, or goes up 
during sleep, we cannot say the person performed the movement. Nor 
can the muscle fiexings necessary to raise one's arm be called an act, 
because although the actor knows he can raise his arm he does not 
"know" how to move his muscles in just the way that will raise the 
arm (p. 73). But when the person knows he can raise his arm and also 
knows that he is exercising that power, he is directly involved in the 
bodily movement. Thus, Moore arrives at what he calls an "epistemic 
indicator" of action: "An actor's bodily movement is a basic action 
only if he knows that he can perform that movement as an action and 
knows that he is doing so on that particular occasion" (p. 73). The 
word "know" in this definition contemplates not only actual aware-
ness of the movement at the time it occurs, but "dispositional" knowl-
edge as well, in the sense that the person, if asked, could say that he 
knows he is raising his arm on the occasion in question (pp. 339-40). 
Under Moore's formulation, the impulsive killer - as well as the 
threatened, addicted and desperate "property takers" described above 
- meet the actus reus requirement so long as they know, in the con-
scious or dispositional sense, that they are going through the bodily 
movements associated with killing or taking from another. On the 
other hand, movements during a hypnotic trance, an epileptic attack 
or sleepwalking are not acts, since they are not movements over which 
the person has conscious control (p. 74). While Moore's conclusions 
on these points are not departures from commonly accepted doc-
trine, 36 they do avoid reliance on the problematic concept of "volun-
tariness" as a predicate for basic action. In practice, it is extremely 
rare for someone to do a basic act for no reason; theoretically, how-
ever, one can "act" even if one does not do so because of a belief/ 
desire set. 
C. Parsing the Concept of Intention 
Moore's approach to the concept of intention parallels his defini-
tion of act. One acts when one knows one can perform, and knows 
35. As Moore points out, a person's responsibility for a complex action such as driving de· 
pends upon whether the practical syllogism that governed the person's basic acts made reference 
to the rules associated with driving. P. 76. This determination is more analogous to an analysis 
of whether an act is intentional, see Part 11.C. infra, than to whether it is an "act" to begin with. 
36. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE&A. Scorr,supra note 32, at§ 25; H. HART, supra note 32, at 96. 
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one is performing, the movement in question. One intends the act 
when one knows its consequences. To use Moore's example: 
A killing will be X's action if the victim's death follows as a consequence 
of some basic action performed by X, the performance of which X had 
knowledge; but a killing will be X's intentional action only if death fol-
lows as a consequence of some basic action by X and X knew that it 
would so follow. [P. 79.] 
Several features of this formulation should be noted. First, as in the 
definition of action, "knowledge" as used here does not require simul-
taneous conscious awareness but merely the ability to state what one 
knows when one is asked to call it forth. As Moore states, "One does 
not, for example, consciously think or deliberate about going to lunch, 
yet doing so is an intentional action for which one may justly be held 
responsible ... " (pp. 339-40). Secondly, because intentionality, like 
action, is based on knowledge, it need not be the result of practical 
reasoning. If one opens the window for the purpose of waving to one's 
friends, but knowing that it will also chill the wine, one has, under 
Moore's definition, intentionally chilled the wine even though that re-
sult was not the reason the window was opened (pp. 78-79). Moore 
explains that his conclusion "is based on the moral notion that one 
who does an act knowing it will lead to some bad result is equally 
culpable as the person who performs that act having the bad result as 
his purpose" (p. 79). 
These features of Moore's approach to intentionality tend to ex-
pand the concept. But Moore would also restrict the idea in two ways. 
First, he rejects the inference that one knows the consequences of one's 
act merely because one did just the act that would cause those 
consequences: 
One's personal self does not know these [behavioral inferences] because 
the extended memory, the device by which one integrates new beliefs or 
other mental states into one's personal self, is not operative. This behav-
ioral sense of knowledge or belief treats one as a purely physical system. 
In this sense, like any other information-processing system with input 
subsystems, one can be said to perceive and believe all sorts of things. 
[P. 329.] 
Similarly, Moore would not include within his definition of knowl-
edge what might be called one's general propositional knowledge. If, 
instead of being able to say, "I know that opening this window will 
chill the wine," the person is only able to say, "Opening a window to a 
room when it is cold outside will chill wine in the room,'' the act of 
chilling the wine should not be seen as intentional. Moore points out 
that equating general propositional knowledge with intention "col-
lapses the important distinction between what one actually knew, and 
what one should have known. . . . This sense of knowledge, like the 
pure behavioral sense, rejects the subjective mental states required for 
culpability" (pp. 330-31 ). 
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Moore can be faulted for somewhat loose terminology. The last 
quoted statement suggests that Moore believes one cannot be culpable 
for negligence, when in fact, as he makes clear elsewhere in the book, 
he actually believes that negligent omissions can make one responsible 
for harm, although perhaps to a lesser degree (pp. 81-84, 342). Simi-
larly, in his definition of intention, Moore does not seem to account for 
the fact that one rarely knows the consequences of one's acts before 
they occur. Rather, as modem criminal statutes recognize, the most 
that can be said is that one is "practically certain" of such conse-
quences. 37 But these oversights are not fatal to his general thesis con-
cerning the connection between knowledge of consequences and 
intention. 
Perhaps a more pertinent observation is that this portion of 
Moore's analysis is not particularly innovative. Many commentators 
have recognized the moral distinctions he makes concerning the mean-
ing of knowing. 38 What is creative is his effort to examine the rele-
vance of unconscious desires and beliefs to the issue of intent. 
Two preliminary questions, of course, are whether unconscious 
desires and beliefs exist and whether they can be said to cause behav-
ior. 39 Moore answers both questions affirmatively.40 The more impor-
37. See, e.g .• MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A person 
acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: • • • (ii) if the element 
involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will 
cause such a result."). With one possible exception, see note 42 infra, Moore makes no mention 
anywhere in the book of the possibility that recklessness - the awareness and disregard of a 
substantial risk of harmful consequences, see MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Offi· 
cial Draft 1962)- might also be a basis for criminal liability. Yet "cause and effect are always 
matters of probability." P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 31, at 240. 
38. See, e.g .• G. FLETCHER, supra note 32, at§ 6.5; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 32, 
at § 28; H. HART, supra note 32, at 116-22. 
39. See generally A. MACINTYRE, THE UNCONSCIOUS (1958); T. MILES, ELIMINATING THE 
UNCONSCIOUS (1966). 
40. According to Moore, the modern philosophical challenge to Freud's assertion that the 
unconscious exists is linguistic in nature, in that it is based on an effort to discern the distinctive 
features of mental words such as intentions, hopes, desires and beliefs. P. 254. A principal claim 
of those that suggest there is no such thing as unconscious intentions, hopes and so on has to do 
with the notion of "privileged access." See, e.g., Alston, Varieties of Privileged Access, 8 AM. 
PHIL. Q. 223 (1971). True mental states, according to this theory, are those we can become 
aware of in a nonobservational, noninferential way. See text following note 8 supra. Thus, we 
can be said to have "privileged" access to these mental states relative to the rest of the world. 
Since we cannot, by definition, have such access to any unconscious material, "the unconscious" 
cannot be considered an actual mental state. See Siegler, Unconscious Intentions, 10 INQUIRY 
251, 257 (1967). 
Moore responds to this argument by positing the idea of "deferred" privileged access. While 
we cannot be aware of unconscious material at the time it may be affecting our actions, we can, 
through psychoanalysis or some other route, eventually become aware of it. What psychoanaly-
sis can occasionally produce (at least according to Freud, supra note 2, at 626, and Moore, p. 
257) is a memory of an unconscious mental state. This memory is produced by reexperiencing 
the unconscious material at a conscious level. Thus, concludes Moore, unconscious mental states 
exist because they have the same primary characteristic as conscious mental states - they can be 
recognized in a nonobservational manner. P. 257. The mere fact that such access is deferred 
does not mean that mental states so discovered could not have caused behavior. 
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tant inquiry is whether unconscious mental states can ever be a motive 
for acting. The argument that they cannot is based on the assertion 
that one is infallible, or "incorrigible," about one's own state of mind 
(at least when one sincerely makes an effort to describe that state of 
mind), and thus one's conscious motives are always the true reasons 
for acting.41 But, as Moore points out, there are occasions when one is 
puzzled about one's motives or does not think one has any motives at 
all (p. 262). More importantly, even if one does have clearly statable 
motives, and if one further assumes that they are incorrigible (which is 
a questionable assumption in itself), this does not mean that they are 
the person's true reasons for acting (p. 264). One could say (correctly) 
that one believes one's reason for opening the window is to chill the 
wine, when in fact the reason is a simultaneous (unconscious) desire to 
chill an unpleasant person who is also in the room. As Moore con-
cludes, "there is nothing suspect about attributing unconscious mo-
tives even when the subject believes his motives to be something 
entirely different" (p. 265). 
This conclusion has obvious implications for the insanity defense, 
because under that rubric the law is interested in a person's reasons for 
acting, even if they happen to be unknown to the actor at the time he 
acts. But does it also mean that what appear to be consciously moti-
vated acts may in fact be "unintentional" if it is discovered they were 
unconsciously produced? To Moore, the answer to this question will 
usually be no. Using his definition of intention, it should be clear that 
one can "intend" one's acts even if one is ignorant of the motives be-
hind them. Unconscious desires and beliefs are irrelevant to whether 
one knows (is aware of or can, by being asked, be made aware of) the 
consequences of one's basic acts. Precisely because our access to un-
conscious motives is "deferred," if it occurs at all, these motives do not 
affect our knowledge of what our actions cause at the time they take 
place.42 · 
Moore's moral justification for fixing one's conscious and disposi-
tional knowledge as the threshold for responsibility is summed up in 
the following passage: 
Whatever else the principle of responsibility might include, it should in-
clude the power or ability to appraise the moral worth of one's proposed 
41. Cf. R. PETERS, THE CoNCEPT OF MOTIVATION 60-61 (1960) (In many cases, conscious 
reasons are "sufficient to explain what a man does; his reason coincides with the reason why he 
acts.") (emphasis in original). 
42. Although Moore generally believes that one should not be responsible for what one 
should have known but did not know, he makes an exception for the "self-deceiver'' - the 
person who (presumably unconsciously) "keeps himself' from knowing that a particular act will 
cause a particular consequence. P. 331. In this sense, unconscious desires can conjinn intention-
ality. Arguably, the self-deception idea could encompass the idea of recklessness (which contem-
plates awareness of a risk and a conscious disregard thereof). See note 37 supra. Both 
recklessness and Moore's self-deception idea involve the problematic distinction between actual 
awareness of a risk and ignorance of a risk of which one should have been aware. 
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actions. A person has such ability only if he has moral and factual 
knowledge of what he is doing and is able to integrate the two to perceive 
the moral quality of his action. [P. 339.] 
Once a person has this moral and factual knowledge, however, he can 
be responsible for his actions even if he has not engaged in practical 
reasoning, 43 or even if his true reasons are unconscious. 
Moore expresses one reservation to this conclusion: unconscious 
motivations may be relevant to intentionality when the criminal law 
requires (and morality demands?) that culpability rest on some type of 
practical reasoning, rather than on mere knowledge. To Moore, the 
clearest examples of this type of crime are the so-called "anticipatory 
offenses," such as attempt.44 Because the conduct in such cases does 
not represent a completed act, it is crucial to determine whether the 
individual acted with the "purpose" of achieving (or as Moore puts it, 
with the "further intent" to achieve) the end which is the subject of 
criminal sanction (pp. 80-81).45 This determination, asserts Moore, 
involves ascertaining the person's reasons for acting. Even if the per-
son charged with attempted murder consciously believed he wanted to 
commit murder, he should not be guilty of attempted murder if his 
real (unconscious) motive was merely to scare the purported victim (p. 
371). To use the terminology of practical reasoning, the individual's 
conscious belief would rationalize his action but would not cause it. 
One can easily accept Moore's assertion that our conscious mental 
states may not explain our actions. Everyone has experienced situa-
tions in which the reason we thought we acted was not our real reason 
for acting. What is not as convincing is his apparent conclusion that 
the law is interested in a person's unconscious reasons for acting when 
the issue is purposive behavior. Arguably, if an individual thought he 
wanted to murder the victim, the fact that his "true" reason for acting 
was something short of this is irrelevant even for "specific intent'' 
crimes such as attempted murder. The person still thinks he is acting 
from a desire to kill, which is all an assessment of culpability would 
seem to require. This situation could perhaps best be analogized to 
one of "factual impossibility," which under both the common law and 
modem statutes is not a defense in attempt cases.46 If Moore is argu-
43. Virtually every intentional action, however, will be the indirect, if not the direct, result of 
some form of practical reasoning, because the basic act which undergirds it will almost always, if 
not always, be done for reasons. 
44. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 32, at§§ 58-62. 
45. Under the Model Penal Code, the mens rea for conduct associated with attempt is "pur-
pose," defined as one's "conscious object." MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(a)(i), 5.0l(l)(a) 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
46. Some controversy exists over whether criminal sanctions - specifically, those associated 
with attempt - should be imposed when circumstances make a crime impossible to commit. See 
generally Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 VA. L. REV. 20 
(1968). Factual impossibility is usually distinguished from legal impossibility. An example of 
the former is picking an empty pocket. Illustrating the latter is the individual who receives goods 
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ing that "purpose" or "specific intent" should, on moral grounds, be 
equated with motive, then his conclusions with respect to the rele-
vance of unconscious reasons may be appropriate. But under the law 
as it stands today, these conclusions are not as persuasive. 
Unconscious mental states, then, will rarely, if ever, negate crimi-
nal intent. As Moore convincingly argues, however, such mental 
states can mitigate responsibility even when an individual does act 
intentionally. 
D. The Resurrection of a Diminished Responsibility Defense? 
Diminished responsibility- the idea that a person's mental condi-
tion may reduce his responsibility for crime even though he is neither 
insane nor lacking the requisite intent - has been explicit doctrine at 
least since 1957, when Britain's Parliament provided, in the Homicide 
Act of that year, for a conviction of manslaughter rather than murder 
when a person's mental abnormality "substantially impaired his 
mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a 
party to the killing."47 To date, however, no legislature or court deci-
sion has extended the doctrine to crimes other than homicides, 48 and 
there appears to be a retreat even from this limited application.49 
While Moore's focus on practical reasoning ability and knowledge 
produces conservative formulations of insanity and intention, respec-
tively, his willingness to consider the possibility that unconscious 
mental states can affect behavior leads him to consider, if not forth-
rightly recognize, what most legislatures and courts have rejected: a 
"partial" defense based on ignorance or compulsion caused by mental 
dysfunction. As to the former, he hypothesizes that some individuals, 
believing (incorrectly) that they are stolen. See Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863, 870-72 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1965). Although the common law usually permitted a defense in cases oflegal impos-
sibility, the Model Penal Code denies a defense in both situations. MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 5.0l(l)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). In the attempted murder example in the text, the 
individual is unaware that it is "factually impossible" for him to complete the offense, just as the 
pickpocket is not aware, before he reaches into the empty pocket, that his crime is impossible. 
47. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, Ch. 11, Part I, § 2(1). 
48. P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 31, at 815. 
49. The califomia Supreme Court appeared to adopt a version of the diminished responsibil-
ity idea in People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 821, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964) (holding 
that a first degree murder conviction requires a finding that the defendant "could maturely and 
meaningfully reflect upon" the killing) (emphasis in original), but the California legislature has 
since passed a statute declaring that "[t]o prove the killing was 'deliberate and premeditated,' it 
shall not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the grav-
ity of his or her act." CAL. PENAL CoDE § 189 (Deering Supp. 1985). 
The Model Penal Code permits a finding of manslaughter for what would otherwise be mur-
der if the homicide "is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse ...• [R]easonableness •.. shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he 
believes them to be." MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3(l)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Even 
under this liberal formulation, a quasi-objective standard is imposed, reflecting some discomfort 
with open-ended inquiries into mental states short of insanity. But see text at notes 68-69 infra. 
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because of unconscious mental states, may be emotionally ignorant of 
the normal consequences of their actions. With respect to compulsion, 
he suggests that unconscious desires can make the choice between law-
abiding and criminal behavior particularly hard for some people. 
To illustrate these points, Moore uses the facts of United States v. 
Pollard, so which involved a police officer who robbed or attempted to 
rob a string of stores and banks. Psychiatrists testified that Mr. Pol-
lard, who claimed that he chose to rob for the money, was actually 
"governed" by an unconscious urge to be punished for the death of his 
first wife and child, both of whom had been brutally murdered by a 
neighbor when Pollard was not home. Although Moore emphasizes 
that the psychiatric evidence presented in the case was extremely 
weak, he hypothesizes that Pollard could have been experiencing a 
high level of anxiety before and during the time of the offense, stem-
ming from his unconscious belief that he had caused the death of his 
wife and child. This anxiety, Moore suggests, could have rendered 
him unable to appreciate, in an emotional sense, that he was endanger-
ing innocent lives, even though he knew, in a dispositional sense, that 
he carried a gun. His complex action of robbing the bank would still 
be intentional (because he knew that robbery was what he was doing), 
but he would not be fully cognizant of nor desire its consequences, 
thus making him less responsible for it (p. 368).5 1 
Alternatively, Pollard could have been compelled to rob by his un-
conscious desires. Again, Moore hypothesizes that if Pollard's "un-
conscious guilt and consequent need to be punished truly explain his 
action of robbing the banks, then it may have been very difficult for 
him to act in any way but to alleviate this guilt feeling" (p. 378). If 
such were the case, the unconscious mental states would not merely 
cause the crime but make the choice to remain law-abiding an espe-
cially hard one. 52 
50. 171 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich. 1959), revd., 282 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1960). 
51. Moore does not explain how this variant of diminished responsibility differs from uncon-
scious self-deception about the consequences of one's acts, which he suggests should confirm 
culpability, not reduce it. See note 42supra. He analogizes the latter situation to the legal notion 
of"willful blindness,'' p. 331, which perhaps entails a keener awareness of the high probability of 
risk in one's actions than exists in the hypothesized Pollard case. See MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is 
an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability 
of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist."). But the distinction is a subtle 
one at best, and thus particularly troubling, because the validity of a diminished responsibility 
claim could rest upon it. 
52. Moore admits that "[t]he compulsion sufficient to excuse will be difficult to determine 
since it is a matter of degree and relative to the gravity of the offense." P. 378. Thus, although 
Moore may have better conceptualized the notion of compulsion, he has not provided any practi-
cal way of distinguishing between compulsion and mere causation. Many other writers have 
concluded that such a distinction is impossible to make, at least in most cases. Professor Bonnie 
has written: 
[T]here is no scientific basis for measuring a person's capacity for self-control or for cali-
brating the impairment of that capacity. There is, in short, no objective basis for distin-
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Moore speaks of emotional ignorance as an "affirmative excuse" 
(p. 368), and of unconscious compulsion as an "excuse in its own 
right" (p. 374). Whether he means to imply by this language that the 
type of evidence described above should be considered at trial is un-
clear. My own feeling is that, consistent with what was said earlier in 
the context of the insanity defense, such evidence should only be ex-
culpatory to the extent that it suggests gross irrationality. Unless the 
factfinder believes, first, that the unconscious desires or beliefs do mo-
tivate the defendant's actions and, second, that they are unintelligible, 
they should not be considered exculpatory. 
At least two arguments - one persuasive, the other much less so 
- can be advanced to support this position. Most fundamentally, di-
minished responsibility evidence which does not suggest irrationality 
is no more important on a moral scale than many other variants of 
compromised, but still rational, functioning which the law does not 
consider relevant in adjudicating guilt. For example, the panicky par-
ent who steals for his starving child and the addict who robs due to 
physiological cravings are generally not excused for their behavior de-
spite their significantly disturbed practical reasoning.53 Yet, to the ex-
tent such phenomena can be measured, the parent is probably as 
emotionally ignorant and the addict as compelled as the individual 
who acts for unconscious reasons in the situations hypothesized by 
Moore. If the law is not willing to accord exculpatory significance to 
the disturbed practical reasoning of the former individuals, it should 
not do so for Pollard unless his reasons for acting were unintelligible. 54 
guishing between offenders who were undeterrable and those who were merely undeterred, 
between the impulse that was irresistible and the impulse not resisted, or between substantial 
impairment of capacity and some lesser impairment. 
Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 196 (1983); see also Morse, 
Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 
589 (1978) ("We simply do not and cannot have a scientifically proven answer to the question of 
whether crazy persons or normal persons have free will."); Wootton, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 
1019, 1027 (1968) ("[I]t is not only difficult to devise a test of volitional competence the validity 
of which can be objectively established: it is impossible."). Even the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation has stated: 
The line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper 
than that between twilight and dusk. • • • The concept of volition is the subject of some 
disagreement among psychiatrists. Many psychiatrists therefore believe that psychiatric tes-
timony (particularly that of a conclusory nature) about volition is more likely to produce 
confusion for jurors than is psychiatric testimony relevant to a defendant's appreciation or 
understanding. 
STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 11 (1982). 
53. The parent obviously intends the act. He could claim necessity or duress, on the ground 
that his act was the lesser of two evils (because otherwise the child would die). See W. LAFAVE 
& A. SCOTT, supra note 32, at§ 49. Yet if the parent could be seen as having choices other than 
theft, if the child's death were not imminent, or if the parent's action was in any other way an 
unreasonable response to the threat of starvation, no defense would be available. Id. 
Likewise, a claim that addiction compelled a theft will usually be considered only at sentenc-
ing, if at all. "[T]here is no discernible trend toward recognizing a defense in such a case." Id. at 
§ 45. 
54. If Pollard, due to emotional disassociation, truly believed that he did not have a gun in 
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Where the law does, and should, freely consider all such individual-
ized factors is at sentencing. ss 
A second ground for prohibiting evidence concerning unconscious 
mental states at trial is a practical one: because such evidence deals 
with slippery notions of "emotional appreciation" and "compelling 
guilt," it should be tolerated only at the less formal sentencing stage. 
Precisely this kind of evidence, however, is commonly introduced at 
trial under current insanity tests. S6 Even under Moore's insanity for-
mulation, testimony about unconscious mental states would be rele-
vant to the extent they truly explain an agent's actions and are 
irrational (p. 373). For that matter, virtually any trial evidence about 
subjective mental states is of suspect reliability. To prohibit similar 
consideration of diminished responsibility evidence on uncertainty 
grounds alone would throw into question other inquiries that Moore 
and others have noted are clearly pertinent to the issue of guilt. 
Therefore, the sole legitimate rationale for restricting questions of di-
minished responsibility to sentencing is the moral ground advanced 
above. 
I do not mean to imply that the difficult proof problems associated 
his hand or that he was withdrawing money from his own account in a polite and nonthreatening 
manner, then it may be that his beliefs were so irrational as to make him nonresponsible. Alter-
natively, if Pollard truly believed (consciously or unconsciously) that robbing banks was the only 
way in which he could be punished for his wife's death, then perhaps a jury would find his 
motivations and beliefs at the time of the offense to be so unintelligible that he should be found 
insane. 
55. See, e.g., MODEL SENTENCING AND CoRRECTIONS Acr § 3-108, 10 U.L.A. 277 (Supp. 
1980-83). 
I realize I am glossing over the fact that some forms of compulsion, e.g., volitional impair-
ment due to mental illness and duress, are considered at trial rather than at sentencing, and that 
an argument can thus be made that all "compulsions" should be considered at the former stage. 
Indeed, there is a strong intuitive appeal to the idea that a person who finds it very hard to keep 
from doing a particular act is not responsible for it. But I think a reasonable limitation, using the 
justification rationale, can and should be placed on the mitigating effect of compulsion. The 
limitation would be as follows: regardless of how compelled one feels to make the choice to 
commit crime, an intelligible choice to do so is justifiable only when it prevents a greater crime. 
To illustrate this stance, a defense would exist in the classical "gun to the head" scenario if the 
harm prevented (e.g., murder of the defendant) is a greater crime than the harm committed (e.g., 
robbery by the defendant). But tlie addict or kleptomaniac is not preventing a crime by giving in 
to his craving; rather, he is attempting to avoid personal pain. Thus, I would argue, he should 
not have a defense. 
I base this approach on the premise that the primary aim of the criminal law is to punish 
those who choose to commit crime. If this is the case, then a person's choice to commit crime is 
excused only when the reasons for doing so are unintelligible. If the person's choice is intelligible, 
it is justified only when the alternative choice is committing a greater crime. All other choices to 
commit crime should be punishable. However, the degree of difficulty in making these other 
choices can and should be considered at the sentencing stage. 
56. See, e.g., the American Law Institute's insanity test, which states, "A person is not re-
sponsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or 
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements oflaw." MODEL PENAL CoDE § 4.01(1) 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). This test is used in over half the states. See Favole, supra note 
22, at 257-69. 
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with criminal mental health law issues can be ignored. Indeed, once 
the appropriate forum for addressing these issues has been fixed, the 
manner in which they are addressed should become paramount. Un-
derstandably, given the philosophical nature of his effort, Moore pays 
scant attention to the technical task of gathering useful evidence con-
cerning the various inquiries he concludes are relevant. But the law 
does not have this luxury. In order to round out the discussion of the 
implications of Moore's thesis for criminal mental health law, the re-
maining substantive section of this review examines how these inquir-
ies can best be answered. More specifically, it looks at the role mental 
health professionals should play in addressing these issues. 
Ill. THE USEFULNESS OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 
Traditionally, the law has turned to mental health professionals to 
help it address the questions about mental states raised by the insanity 
defense, the diminished responsibility notion, and the act requirement. 
To a lesser extent, it has also sought clinical expertise in making mens 
rea determinations. Moore's conceptualization of responsibility would 
curtail clinical testimony about unconscious mental states in the latter 
two contexts. 57 And in all of these contexts, it would place limits on 
evidence about characterological, physiological, or external factors 
which merely "cause" behavior rather than affect the capacity to act 
intentionally or act for reasons. 58 But even if one adopts Moore's ap-
57. See text at notes 35-36 & 41-45 supra. 
Evidence about unconscious mental states may be relevant to the insanity and diminished 
responsibility inquiries. Should such evidence be admissible even when the actor's conscious 
mental states appear to explain his actions quite adequately? Moore seems to think so, though he 
does state: "For seemingly quite rational actors, ... one may be more suspicious of the truth of 
the psychoanalytic explanations in terms of their unconscious mental states." P. 373 (emphasis in 
original). 
A more restrictive rule of thumb might be that whenever one's conscious desires and beliefs 
do not seem rational in the transitive sense, see text preceding note 26 supra, the law should 
permit investigation into unconscious mental states. It will be recalled that under Moore's for-
mulation, the transitive sense of rationality contemplates desires and beliefs that are implied by 
one another. Although he is speaking of all reasons for acting, not just conscious ones, the idea 
could perhaps be confined to conscious reasons for the sole purpose of establishing a threshold 
for determining when unconscious reasons are material for legal purposes. Thus, in Pollard, if it 
could be shown that Pollard both consciously wanted to rob banks for the money and in addition 
consciously believed he did not need money, the factfinder would be entitled to evidence concern-
ing unconscious mental states, since it would be quite possible that those states, and not the 
conscious ones, would be the true explanations for the behavior. 
58. See text at notes 15-20 supra. In Moore's view much of what is currently common in 
clinical testimony - evidence about the defendant's childhood, employment "stressors" or 
"character'' - would probably be immaterial to criminal mental health issues. The practical 
problem, of course, is determining when a pl\rticular factor is irrelevant to understanding a per-
son's unconscious mental states, knowledge at the time of the offense, or difficulty in making a 
particular choice. See note 52 supra. Given this problem, Moore's conceptual limitation may 
not have a major impact on the types of clinical evidence considered admissible. 
As one illustration of this point, take evidence about an individual's character. Moore states 
that an individual's character does not "constrain his choices in the way in which a gun at his 
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proach to criminal health law, considerable latitude remains for opin-
ions from mental health professionals. 
The principal question has been not whether psychiatric testimony 
is relevant in criminal cases, but whether its usefulness is outweighed 
by its lack of trustworthiness. 59 It is generally conceded that mental 
health professionals are better than laypersons at gathering the behav-
iorial data relevant to criminal law questions. 60 It is also agreed by 
most, if not all, that clinicians should be prohibited from offering opin-
ions about the moral issues the jury alone is supposed to address.61 
The controversy centers on the extent to which clinicians should be 
allowed to provide the factfinder with inferences derived from their 
behavioral observations which fall short of trenching upon the ulti-
mate legal question. 
There are in essence two arguments which have been advanced in 
favor of excluding such clinical inferences from criminal trials. The 
first is that these inferences are so speculative that they are lacking in 
probative value. The second is that, even if they do have some proba-
tive worth, they add nothing to what the factfinder can discern for 
itself once it has access to the relevant behavioral data. 
There is no doubt that clinical theories, and opinions based upon 
them, are generally suspect. Stephen Morse's conclusion about psy-
chodynamic formulations - that "external, empirical investigations 
have produced, at best, only equivocal and pallid confirmations of 
Freud's theory"62 - could probably well be applied to most psychiat-
ric and psychological theories. But in the context at issue here -
when the defendant wishes to rely on clinical testimony to raise a 
doubt as to the culpability of his mental state - a blanket prohibition 
on theory-based psychiatric evidence should not be countenanced. All 
that the evidentiary formulation should require (and all that the fed-
head would. . . . [R]ather, characters are themselves constructs created by generalizing about 
what one does when one's choices are unconstrained." P. 88. Yet, in addition to this "evalua-
tional character," Moore also admits the existence of an "appetitive character," which can com-
pel actions. Pp. 440 n.123, 488 n.41. He provides no useful way of differentiating between the 
two concepts, with one result that even under his approach testimony about character is not 
likely to be restricted appreciably. Moreover, even if character testimony is not generally mate-
rial to compulsion issues, it could easily be relevant to intent. See, e.g., United States v. Staggs, 
553 F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1977) (testimony by psychologist that defendant was more 
likely to hurt himself than others held relevant on issue of ability to form intent to assault with a 
deadly weapon). 
59. See generally J. ZISK.IN, CoPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 
(2d ed. 1975); Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Pro-
cess: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. R.Ev. 427, 466-95 (1980); Morse, supra note 
52, at 601-11; Comment, The Psychologist as Expen Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 Mo. 
L. R.Ev. 539 (1979). 
60. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 52, at 611-19. 
61. See, e.g .• CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-3.9(a), 7-6.6 (First Tenta-
tive Draft 1983); Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 59, at 456-57; Morse, supra note 52, at 602-03. 
62. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 
VA. L. R.Ev. 971, 1014 (1982). 
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eral rules do require)63 is that such testimony have some tendency to 
prove a fact at issue, 64 and that it come from a qualified professiona165 
who has followed adequate evaluation procedures66 and who avoids 
addressing issues which are outside his specialized knowledge67 (such 
as whether the defendant is morally and legally accountable). 
This stance is based on two separate justifications, one normative, 
the other evidentiary. First, as Professor Bonnie and I have argued 
elsewhere, 
The law's tolerance for speculation and imprecision varies according to 
the context and consequence of the inquiry. When a defendant claims 
that his psychological aberration has, or ought to have, exculpatory or 
mitigating significance, the risk of unreliable decisionmaking is often ac-
cepted in deference to the perceived ethical imperatives of 
individualization. 68 
Thus, for instance, modem formulations of excusing conditions such 
as insanity and diminished responsibility (including Moore's) provide 
only "that degree of specificity necessary to give the jury adequate 
normative guidance regarding the nature of the question being 
63. See Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 128-48 (1984) (dis-
cussing FED. R. Evm. 401, 403, 702, 703, 704). 
64. The basis of admissibility for any evidence is relevance, which is defined by FED. R. 
Evm. 401 to mean "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence." Clinical evidence which is material, see notes 57-58 supra, and which is presented by 
appropriately qualified professionals, see notes 65-67 infra, will generally meet this test, which 
only requires that evidence rise above mere speculation. See James, Relevancy, Probability and 
the Law, 29 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 689, 690-91 (1941). 
Relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403. 
The factors listed in Rule 403 will generally not apply when the defendant is presenting expert 
testimony in criminal cases because, for reasons discussed in the text at notes 70-75 infra, one 
purpose for admitting such testimony is to combat undue prejudice against the defendant assert-
ing a claim of mental abnormality. 
65. FED. R. Evm. 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise." In the context at issue here, the proffered witness would need 
to show both educational and experiential qualifications relating to the study of human behavior 
in order to meet this requirement. For a more detailed description of these qualifications, see 
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 59, at 457-61. 
66. FED. R. Evm. 703 appears to require an investigation into evaluation procedures because 
it states that the facts or data upon which an expert opinion or inference is based must be "of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences 
upon the subject." Given the speculative nature of the endeavor, it is imperative that the expert 
attempt to assess past mental state in as rigorous a manner as possible. See Bonnie & Slobogin, 
supra note 59, at 504-22 (suggesting methods of maximizing the reliability of clinical assessment). 
67. FED. R. Evm. 704 states: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact." However, if the "ultimate issue" is one that is moral rather than scientific in nature (as is 
the case with the issue of whether a person is "insane"), then Rule 702 would bar such testimony 
because it is not based on "specialized knowledge." See note 65 supra. 
68. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 59, at 434-35. 
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asked."69 The vagueness of these doctrines implies a tolerance for 
some amount of imprecision in applying them to specific cases. Indi-
vidualization under standards such as these would be frustrated if the 
defendant were forced to forgo using the informed speculation of ex-
perts and to rely instead solely on his own statements and those of lay 
witnesses. 
A second, independent justification for permitting clinical testi-
mony rests on an admittedly debatable perception of the realities of 
criminal adjudication. The perception is that, despite the "presump-
tion of innocence" accorded criminal defendants, 70 in fact a judge or 
jury is likely to assume just the opposite. After all, the factfinder 
might reason, the state would not have gone to the trouble of prosecut-
ing the defendant were he not guilty. Anyone who has read a newspa-
per account of the latest indictment or arrest can understand this 
notion.71 Of course, an instruction that the prosecution must prove all 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt may have a powerful 
effect on an otherwise biased factfinder. 72 And when the defendant is 
claiming he did not commit the actus reus for the crime, objective evi-
dence is usually available to overcome any predisposition to convict 
the defendant. But when the defendant admits he committed the 
criminal act, which he in effect does by asserting a mental defense, the 
type of evidence which he can present in support of his case is more 
subjective, more amorphous, and more likely to be seen as self-serving 
than evidence relating to the actus reus.73 Under these circumstances, 
69. Id. at 435 n.17. 
70. As LaFave and Scott have pointed out, the so-called presumption of innocence is actually 
not a presumption at all because it does not contemplate the typical logical pattern of a presump· 
tion, namely that once an underlying fact has been proved, another fact may (or must) be taken 
as proved. It is in fact an instruction to the jury designed to counteract the fact that the defen-
dant has been accused. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 32, at§ 8. 
71. Professors Saks and Kidd conclude that there is a considerable amount of evidence sug-
gesting the existence of a "hindsight effect." As the authors describe this phenomenon, "input 
information is perceived as far more predictive of the outcome once the outcome is known than 
when the outcome is still in doubt.'' Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudica-
tion: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SocY. R.Ev. 123, 143-44 (1980-81). They suggest that a 
criminal trial may produce this effect because the factfinder is given the "answer" - the defend-
ant - before it is asked to consider the evidence and decide whether the evidence proves the 
suggested conclusion that the defendant committed the act charged. Id. at 145. 
72. Id. 
73. As Professor Bonnie and I have said in the context of testimony on mens rea: 
In a criminal case involving subjective mens rea requirements, the prosecution usually has 
no direct evidence concerning the defendant's state of mind; it must rely on "common 
sense" inferences drawn from the defendant's conduct. This has the practical effect of shift-
ing the burden to the defendant to demonstrate that he did not perceive, believe, expect, or 
intend what an ordinary person would have perceived, believed, expected, or intended under 
the same circumstances. Restriction of clinical testimony on mens rea thus compromises 
the defendant's opportunity to present a defense on an issue concerning which he, in reality, 
bears the burden of proof. The factfinder is likely to view with considerable skepticism the 
defendant's claim that he did not function as would a normal person under the circum-
stances ..•• By precluding the defendant from offering relevant expert testimony, the law 
unduly enhances the prosecution's advantage on this issue. 
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a restrictive standard of proof provides decidedly less protection 
against unwarranted assumptions. Indeed, the jury is often told that it 
may infer or presume intent from the mere fact the defendant acted. 74 
The defendant should not be forced to rebut this presumption (which 
exists in fact even when it is not given de jure status) without the aid of 
expert testimony, even if the reliability of such testimony is not veri-
fied. The expert functions as a bias rebutter; he helps redress the ine-
quality that would otherwise exist due to the natural tendency to infer 
intentional, rational action.7s 
For these reasons, psychiatric testimony about past mental state 
which meets the evidentiary stipulations described earlier should not 
be barred solely because it is of questionable trustworthiness. Nor 
should it be barred because of the critics' second argument - that 
clinical opinion testimony does not assist the factfinder and is there-
fore not "expert." If the testimony is in fact based on knowledge or 
skill which is "specialized" it will, by definition, add to what the 
factfinder can discover for itself. Occasionally, the basis of the expert's 
opinion may not meet this threshold test; 76 in such cases it should be 
excluded. But on a topic as complex as the human mind, any incre-
mental addition to the factfinder's knowledge should be permitted. 
And surely, increasing a jury's exposure to alternative perspectives is 
helpful. 
Moore does not dwell on these issues. To the extent one can dis-
cern his attitude about the reliability or helpfulness of clinical testi-
mony, he appears to be ambivalent. He cites Morse's negative review 
of Freudian theory with approval (p. 279), and at one point suggests 
that to the extent psychiatrists subscribe to the hard determinist view77 
their testimony about unconscious mental states will be of little value 
(p. 364). But he also states that even in the problematic area of com-
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 59, at 477. To a lesser extent, similar conclusions could be drawn 
with respect to the de facto burden of proof in insanity and diminished responsibility cases. 
74. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 32, at§ 28 ("a maxim much used in criminal 
law cases states that a person is 'presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his 
acts.'"); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 251 la (3d ed. 1949). But see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 
U.S. 510 (1979) (holding that it is a violation of due process to give jury an instruction which has 
the effect of shifting the burden on the mens rea issue; however, jurors may be told they may infer 
intent from such acts). 
75. Cf. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome 
Issue and its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985) 
(arguing that evidence of rape trauma syndrome should be admissible in part to overcome 
preconceptions of jurors about rape); cf. Slobogin, supra note 63, at 145-48 (arguing that strong 
assumption on the part of a factfinder that person subjected to commitment or sentencing pro-
ceedings is dangerous justifies prohibiting presentation of clinical evidence to prove dangerous-
ness unless defense elects to do so). 
76. For instance, testimony that a person is compelled may exceed the bounds of professional 
knowledge. See note 52 supra. 
77. See text at note 16 supra. 
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pulsion, "the law may get some help from psychiatry" (p. 379).78 As-
suming appropriately qualified testimony, the law should not refuse 
this help. 
CONCLUSION 
This review of Michael Moore's Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking 
the Relationship has focused on the book's rich implications for crimi-
nal mental health law. It has not touched upon several other interest-
ing facets of Moore's work which both lawyers and mental health 
professionals may find of interest. Lawyers, for instance, should find 
enlightening his overview of the civil law from the perspective of lin-
guistic philosophy (pp. 44-112). Mental health professionals may ben-
efit from his analysis of psychoanalytic explanation (pp. 281-309). 
Both groups should find useful his attack on the Szaszian notion that 
mental illness does not exist (pp. 155-216) and his discussion of the 
thesis that each of us is composed of multiple selves (pp. 387-415). 
If there is a significant flaw to the book, it is that its usefulness is 
somewhat diminished by its density and occasional lack of clarity. If 
Moore's methodological objective of prodding lawyers and mental 
health professionals into reexamining their assumptions is to be real-
ized, philosophical treatment of their respective disciplines must be 
approachable. A major aim of this review has been to unpack what 
Moore has said about criminal mental health law and describe it in 
more accessible terms. 
This criticism should not obscure the fact that Law and Psychiatry 
is a remarkable achievement. Although many of its chapters were 
written as separate articles over a period of thirteen years and "were 
not originally produced with the intent of joining them as a book with 
a single theme" (p. xi), the work is a coherent exegesis of the philo-
sophical underpinnings of both law and psychiatry. It should stand as 
a major contribution to the field for years to come. 
78. Moore uses as an example of this possibility testimony about kleptomania. He suggests 
that if psychiatrists can tie the kleptomaniac's urge to steal to strong sexual feelings, the 
factfinder, drawing upon its own fund of experience in the latter area, might "begin to under-
stand what it would be like to experience what kleptomaniacs experience before and as they 
steal." P. 379. 
